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Abstract 
One important aspect of enhancing creativity in organizations is to measure and 
reward creativity.  However, not every creative process can be immediately tied to and 
measured by numerical standards.  In such cases, the manager’s subjective impression of 
employee creativity may replace objective measures as the basis for decision-making.  In 
an organizational context, the social context in which the work occurs must be thoroughly 
considered as employees often work in groups on major products.  As such, this paper 
examines two questions on how the social setting affects the observer’s perception of 
creativity assessment.  First, I demonstrate that observers use surface features of groups 
to infer the creativity of group output: They expect demographically diverse groups to be 
more creative than homogeneous groups and this difference in expectation biases the 
evaluation.  Second, when observers form impressions of individual creativity based on 
group output, I demonstrate that they commit the fundamental attribution error in 
partitioning credit between others in the group and the target individual.  In turn this 
either benefits or costs the perceived creativity of the target, depending on the objective 
quality of group output.  Taken together, the two questions addressed in this paper 
emphasize the need for further research on factors that influence the observer’s 
perception of creativity in an organizational context. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Literature Review  
Introduction 
Businesses care about creativity because it is a source of innovation and 
performance.  In a study by IBM, 1,500 Chief Executive Officers from 60 countries and 
33 industries were interviewed, and it was found that CEOs believed that creativity is the 
most crucial factor for future success (IBM, 2010).  In line with these beliefs, companies 
often instill various programs designed to promote the creativity of their employees.  For 
example, Novell Inc., a multinational software and services company, has a company-
wide incubator program where employees are encouraged to submit new business 
proposals. John Dragoon, the Chief Marketing Officer, has stated that such a program 
“demonstrates how product development initiatives can be driven by many individuals 
across an organization and how a creative approach embraced by everyone within a 
company can ultimately play a significant role in driving market leadership” (Forbes, 
2010). 
One important aspect of enhancing creativity in organizations is to measure and 
reward creativity.  For example, Zingheim and Schuster (2007) interviewed the top 20 
tech firms based on three lists (Forbes, Fortune 500, BusinesWeek) and found that 80 
percent of the companies used objective measures to evaluate innovation/creativity (e.g., 
revenue or income from new products or services, new income streams from combining 
capabilities to form new directions) and rewarded employees based on these 
measurements through cash incentives, raises and promotion.  However, not every 
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creative process can be immediately tied to and measured by numerical standards such as 
financial thresholds.  In such cases, the manager’s subjective impression of individual 
creativity may replace objective measures as the basis for decisions on employee rewards.   
However, there is limited research on “individual attributes, interpersonal 
behaviors and social cues that decision makers in organizations find salient and relevant 
when assessing other’s creative potential or about how they use such cues” (Elsbach & 
Kramer, 2003).  The limited research that exists has found that perceptions of creativity 
can be affected by various implicit theories of creativity about individuals and groups that 
do not always agree with more objective measures of creativity.  For example, people 
hold gender- and race-based stereotypes about creativity that cause them to evaluate the 
creativity of the same output differently depending on the source (Baer & Kaufman, 2008; 
Kaufman, Baer, Agars, & Loomis, 2010; Kaufman, Baer, Cole, & Sexton, 2008).  Further, 
people have the illusion that groups are more creative than the sum of individuals (or 
nominal groups) although there appears to be no reliable difference in the quantity and/or 
quality of ideas generated between the two (Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes, & Camacho, 1993; 
Stroebe, Diehl, & Abakoumkin, 1992). 
Adding to the challenge of perceiving creativity in an organizational setting is the 
fact that the work is often completed in groups.  In such cases, I argue that the social 
setting (i.e., the group) becomes an important situational factor that influences the 
manager’s subjective impressions.  As such, the present research explores how the social 
context influences the assessment of creativity regarding the product and the target.  First, 
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research on creativity stereotypes suggests that people may hold a variety of implicit (and 
inaccurate) theories about creativity that affect the evaluation of output.  In organizational 
contexts, managers are typically aware of the demographic composition of groups they 
evaluate and I argue that this knowledge likely influences their perceptions of group 
performance across subjective dimensions such as creativity.  More specifically, I 
propose that observers will use surface features of groups to infer the creativity of group 
output: They will expect demographically diverse groups to be more creative than 
homogeneous groups (when the output is both present and absent), and this difference in 
expectation will bias their evaluation.   
Second, when managers form impressions of individual creativity based on group 
output, the social setting (i.e. the group) becomes an important situational factor that 
influences individual performance.  Managers must then try to partition credit between 
other members in the group and the target individual.  However, inferring individual 
responsibility from group effort is a challenging task.  For example, Savitsky, Van Boven, 
Epley and Wight (2005) showed that members of a group often estimate their own 
contribution to group output in a self-serving way.  Furthermore, decades of work on the 
fundamental attribution error has shown that people often draw on dispositional 
inferences while undervaluing situational factors for both individual (Gilbert & Malone, 
1995; Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977) and group behavior (Allison, Beggan, Midgley, 
& Wallace, 1995; Allison, Mackie, & Messick, 1996; Allison & Messick, 1985).  
Similarly, I propose that observers will insufficiently discount individual ability when the 
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individual performs as part of a group and the degree to which they discount individual 
ability depends on the salience of the situational factor: When the target person has 
worked in a group but is depicted alone (i.e. weak situational salience), observers will 
infer the target’s creativity as if that person had performed the task alone.  Conversely, 
when the target has worked in a group and is depicted with the group, observers will 
partition credit between the group and the target and therefore discount individual 
creativity.  For uncreative products, a reverse process is expected:  Individuals working in 
a group but depicted alone will be seen as uncreative as someone who produced the same 
poor output alone.  Blame for poor output will also be discounted when observers see the 
individual depicted with the group. 
Chapter 2 and 3 test these ideas.  Chapter 2 tests whether people have a lay theory 
that demographically diverse groups are more creative, and explores the consequences.  
In these studies, I show that people perceive demographically diverse groups as having 
more cognitive diversity and this in turn affects the evaluation of group output. First, they 
hold higher creative expectation for demographically diverse groups when diversity is 
salient.  Next, when judges see an output from a demographically diverse group that 
meets their expectations, they assimilate it to their highest expectation and rate it as more 
creative compared to the same output from a homogeneous group, leading to a bonus in 
creativity assessment.  However, output that does not meet their expectation is perceived 
to be less creative compared to the same output when it is attributed to a homogeneous 
group, leading to a penalty in perceived creativity.   
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Chapter 3 tests whether people give too much credit (and blame) to individuals 
when they have worked in a group but the group is not psychologically salient.  In these 
studies, the target is evaluated for creativity based on the same group output using 
different evaluation contexts that differ in salience of the group (target alone vs. target 
within the group.)  When the target is evaluated alone, I demonstrate that observers treat 
the evaluation process as if the target had created the output alone.  On the other hand, 
when the target is evaluated within the group, observers discount group contribution from 
individual performance and this discounting affects the perceived creativity of the target 
in two ways:  For objectively creative group output, the target is perceived to be less 
creative in group evaluation because some of the credit is attributed to the group for 
producing a successful product.  For uncreative output, observers spread the blame to the 
group and this leads the target to be perceived as more creative in a group evaluation.  In 
other words, when the situational cue is salient, the group acts as a buffer that takes the 
credit or the blame away from the target.  This is either beneficial or detrimental to how 
the target’s creativity is perceived.   
In the remainder of this chapter I will first review the literature, summarizing both 
the general theories of creativity derived from social psychology as well as factors that 
affect organizational creativity.  I will then discuss the need for organizational research 
on the perception of creativity in group contexts and propose specific biases that 
observers make in evaluating the creativity of both the group output and individual 
members.  
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Literature Review  
Traditionally, research on creativity has focused more on what leads to creativity 
than on factors that affect how it is inferred or perceived.  In the 1950 meeting of the 
American Psychological Association, Guilford (1950) used his presidential address to 
stress the importance of studying creativity and as a result, the first wave of creativity 
research was born where creativity was defined as a dichotomous category of big C 
(genius and eminent creativity) and little C (everyday creativity).  From this crude 
categorization, the more contemporary researchers have identified four different aspects 
(or four P’s) of creativity: Person, Place, Process, and Product (Kozbelt, Beghetto, & 
Runco, 2010).  First, traditional research has focused on identifying personal traits (e.g., 
openness to experience and autonomy) of creativity in the domains of art and science 
(Barron, 1993) and the type of environmental factors (e.g., opportunity for exploration, 
originality valued) that promote creativity (Witt & Beorkrem, 1989).  Second, research 
on cognitive theories of creative thinking has identified two main underlying components 
within a creative process: divergent thinking (Guilford, 1968) and cognitive flexibility.  
Divergent thinking relates to an ability to generate original and multiple solutions to a 
problem by thinking outside the box while cognitive flexibility involves the ability to 
restructure the problem in multiple ways to fit the changing demands. Working together, 
they help people find solutions to challenging problems (Gino & Ariely, 2012).  
Examples of issues addressed in this research include the comparison of cognitive 
mechanism between creative and noncreative thinking and the roles of conscious versus 
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non-conscious processes (Kozbelt et al., 2010).  Moreover, various contextual factors 
(e.g., experience living abroad) that promote creative problem solving (Leung, Maddux, 
Galinsky, & Chiu, 2008; Markman, Lindberg, Kray, & Galinsky, 2007) including 
different cognitive (e.g., global versus local processing styles) and motivational factors 
that affect creativity (Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004; Friedman & Förster, 2001) 
have been studied.   
Third, as a product, creativity has also been defined as the generation of ideas that 
are novel and useful (Amabile, 1983; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Shalley, 1991; Zhou 
& Shalley, 2008) and several evaluative tests and techniques have been developed in an 
effort to measure it with objective standards.  For example, the consensual assessment 
technique (CAT) asks participants to generate products (such as stories or poems) that are 
then rated by domain experts for creativity (Amabile, 1983; Baer, Kaufman, & Gentile, 
2004; Kaufman et al., 2008).  Other tests, like the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking 
(Duncker & Lees, 1945; Mednick, 1962; Torrance, 1968) or the Remote Association Test 
(Mednick, 1962), measure participants on verbal and math abilities.   
While most of the research on creativity has been carried out with the assumption 
that creativity is beneficial, a rising topic of interest has been on the “dark side of 
creativity” that can lead to negative and malevolent outcomes.  For example, creative 
people tend to be more arrogant (Silvia, Kaufman, Reiter-Palmon, & Wigert, 2011) and 
generate better lies (Walczyk, Runco, Tripp, & Smith, 2008).  Furthermore, Gino and 
Ariely (2012) have illustrated that when creative people are motivated to behave 
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unethically, divergent thinking helps them generate original ways to bypass moral rules 
and cognitive flexibility helps to reinterpret available information to fit self-interest. As 
such, creative people can better justify their dishonesty, which in turn promotes cheating 
behavior.  Next, moving beyond the basic psychology of creativity, I review the research 
on factors that promote organizational creativity and the need for research on how 
creativity is evaluated in an organizational context.  
Factors that Promote Creativity in Organizations 
Research has found that creativity is positively related to a number of desirable 
organizational outcomes, such as performance and innovation, at every level of 
organization.  At the individual level, creativity is correlated with better performance 
rating (Powers & Kaufman, 2004; Scott, Leritz, & Mumford, 2004), more innovation 
depending on the environment (Axtell et al., 2000) and job satisfaction (Runco, 1995).  
Furthermore, support for the creative process leads to more innovation from groups 
(West & Anderson, 1996) and organizations alike (Janssen et al, 2004), and this in turn 
leads to better performance (Taylor & Greve, 2006).   
 The research on organizational creativity started to flourish in the 1980s and the 
main focus has been on factors that foster creativity in the work environment.  For 
example, the componential model of creativity (Amabile, 1983, 1996) identified three 
factors that can promote employee creativity: domain-relevant skills, creativity-relevant 
process and task motivation.  To summarize, one must possess not only the expert 
knowledge in a given domain but also the appropriate cognitive styles and strategies in 
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order to produce creative ideas.  As the last ingredient, the model emphasizes the 
importance of having intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for the task at hand.  In the 1990s, 
many comprehensive frameworks were suggested to capture variables that influence 
employee creativity at every level – individual, group, organizational and environmental.  
Most noticeably, Woodman, Sawyer and Griffin (1993) argued that creative performance 
is a result of different inputs of individual (e.g., cognitive style, personality, motivation), 
group (e.g., norm, size, diversity, cohesiveness) and organizational (e.g., culture, 
resource, structure, reward) factors being transformed by situational influences.  
Similarly, others have shown that personality scales like the Creative Personality Scale 
(Gough, 1979) and the Five Factor Model of Personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992) 
interact with contextual factors such as feedback, coworker support, supportive 
supervision and openness to feedback to influence creativity.  In the 2000s, the social side 
of creativity gained popularity.  For example, using the social network approach, Perry-
Smith and Shalley (2003) argued that those with weak ties to their profession may be 
more creative because their connections outside the network can provide more creative 
insights.   
While much is known about how to foster creative environment in organizations, 
there is a lack of research on situational factors that influence the subjective perception of 
original products and their creators.  Kasof (1995) argued that this gap in knowledge is 
“important not only because the reception of an original product critically influences 
whether and to what extent the product is creative, but also because an original product’s 
 10 
 
reception may facilitate or inhibit the future production of creative works by the creator 
and by other potential creators” (p 314).  As such, I briefly review factors that influence 
perception of creativity and propose several key situational factors that warrants attention 
in the evaluation of creativity in an organizational context. 
Perception of Creativity  
Due to a lack of absolute standards, evaluation of creativity is likely to be 
influenced by a variety of creativity stereotypes that stem from an observer’s implicit 
theories (Sternberg, 1985, 1990).  For example, Lebuda and Karwowski (2013) had 
participants rate the creativity of products from the domains of art and science and 
showed that the same artwork was rated to be more creative when it was associated with 
a unique last name (compared to a common last name) while the same scientific theory 
received a higher rating of creativity when it was thought to be generated by a male 
(compared to a female.)  Lay theories of creativity can affect not only assessment but also 
acceptance of creative behavior.  For example, teachers hold predisposed beliefs on 
characteristics that constitute students’ creativity (nonconformity, impulsiveness and 
disruptive) that are inaccurate when compared against standardized test scores of 
creativity.  In turn, creative students are often classified as disruptive to the class and far 
from their conceptualization of an ideal student (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 
2005; Chan & Chan, 1999).  Lastly, lay theories are used pervasively even when there is 
no prior information about the person on which to base judgment.  For example, by 
studying meetings where relatively unknown screenwriters pitch their ideas in 
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Hollywood, Elsbach and Kramer (2003) found that studio executives and producers use 
both dispositional and relational cues to fit screenwriters to creative prototypes in order to 
judge their creative potential. 
A key situational factor that warrants attention in an organizational context is the 
social setting under which the work occurs.  Since many projects in organizations are 
completed in groups, managers are required to not only rate the creativity of group output 
but also form impressions of individual performance based on this output.  In such cases, 
I argue that the social setting (i.e. the group) influences observers’ assessment of 
creativity of both the product and the target person.  Next, I raise specific hypotheses 
relating to the assessment of output and the target based on established theories from 
social psychology. 
Assessment of Group Output: Lay Theory of Diversity  
Previous research has distinguished two forms of diversity (Harrison & Klein, 
2007; Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey, 2002).  Surface diversity (such as demographic 
diversity) often impairs individual creativity in groups because social categorization 
processes lead to relational divides and conflicts (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999; 
Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999).  In contrast, deep level diversity (such as cognitive 
diversity due to different training) promotes creativity by tapping the power of divergent 
expertise and perspectives (Williams & O'Reilly, 1998).  I hypothesize, however, that 
observers do not make fine distinctions among types of diversity and hold a general 
theory that demographic diversity is correlated with cognitive diversity.  Consistent with 
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this, Kurtzberg (2005) has proposed that people use demographic diversity as a cue that 
differences in perspectives exist among group members.  Research on the hidden profile 
task (in which each member of a group holds some important unique information) 
supports this claim.  Phillips, Northcraft and Neale (2006) found that members of groups 
with high surface level diversity perceived their information to be more unique and 
therefore engaged in more thorough information processing compared to members of 
groups with low surface level diversity.   
Hypothesis 1: People hold a lay theory that demographically diverse groups have 
more cognitive diversity than do demographically homogeneous groups and this in turn 
will help demographically diverse groups to produce more creative group output. 
If observers hold prior beliefs about the creative potential of groups as a function 
of demographic diversity, this in turn is likely to influence their expectations.  For 
example, compared to the members in demographically homogeneous groups, those in 
diverse groups expect to perform better across dimensions such as creativity (van 
Oudenhoven-van der Zee, Paulus, Vos, & Parthasarathy, 2009). In a similar fashion, I 
argue that the lay theory about demographic diversity would be translated to higher 
expectations of creativity.   
Hypothesis 2: When the demographic diversity of a group is salient, it will evoke 
people’s lay theory of group diversity and lead them to expect more creative output from 
demographically heterogeneous groups than from homogeneous groups.   
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Furthermore, to the extent that people hold different expectations for 
demographically diverse and homogeneous groups, these expectations are likely to 
influence judgments of creativity.  I propose that these expectations will lead to 
assimilation of expectation-consistent information and contrast of expectation-
inconsistent information (Oliver, 1980; Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Wilson, Lisle, Kraft, & 
Wetzel, 1989). When observers see output from a demographically diverse group that 
meets their expectation, they will assimilate it to their high expectation and rate it as more 
creative compared to the same output from a homogeneous group.  Conversely, when 
observers see output from a demographically diverse group that does not meet their 
expectation, they will contrast it away from their high expectation and perceive the output 
to be less creative than the same product from a homogeneous group. 
Hypothesis 3a: The same creative group output will be rated as more creative 
when it is attributed to a demographically diverse group (via assimilation to high 
expectation), leading to a bonus in perceived creativity of group output.  
Hypothesis 3b: The same uncreative group output will be rated as less creative 
when it is attributed to a demographically diverse group (via contrast from high 
expectation), leading to a penalty in perceived creativity of group output. 
Assessment of Target: The Attribution Error in Perceived Individual Creativity  
Although behavior is a function of the person and the situation (Heider, 1982; 
Lewin, 1951), people often rely too heavily on dispositional explanations and neglect 
situational factors as the causes of behavior.  This tendency to draw on dispositional 
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inference, which has been termed the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977; Ross & 
Nisbett, 1991) or the correspondence bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995), was demonstrated in 
a classic study by Jones and Harris (1967).  The study asked participants to read an essay 
on Fidel Castro, the president of Cuba, and rate the essayists’ true attitude toward him.  
As expected, they inferred strong pro- and anti-Castro attitudes when they were informed 
that essayists freely chose a position to show support or not.  However, participants made 
similar inferences about essayists even when they knew that essayists did not have a 
choice and were randomly assigned to a position.  Over the years, the literature has 
repeatedly demonstrated the robustness of this effect.  For example, Gilbert and Jones 
(1986) had participants give behavioral orders to actors on various political questions that 
were either self-generated or from the experimenter.  They found that participants 
inferred correspondent attitudes not only when the participants caused the actor to behave 
as the experimenter requested but also when the participants generated the questions.  
Similar to how observers of individual behavior are likely to assume too much 
correspondence between behavior and disposition, Allison and colleagues (Allison et al., 
1995; Allison et al., 1996; Allison & Messick, 1985; Allison, Worth, & King, 1990) 
showed that observers of group behavior are also likely to assume correspondence 
between group decisions and members’ dispositional characteristics even though the 
group’s decision is a function of members’ attitudes, structural properties and decision 
rules.  For example, Allisson and Massick (1985) had participants infer the attitudes of 
Montana voting citizens based on information about the outcome of a fictitious Montana 
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recall election.  To do this, participants were given two types of information: the actual 
percentage of the voters who supported the recall and the minimum percentage of voter 
support needed for the recall attempt to succeed (i.e. the decision rule), which was varied 
across conditions.  The results showed that participants perceived voters as being more in 
favor of the recall when a given percentage of voter support exceeded the required 
threshold than when the same percentage was described as below the requirement. 
In an organizational context, the social setting in which the work occurs is an 
important situational cause of individual performance (Jones, 1986).  For example, when 
employees work in teams on major projects, the group becomes the situational factor that 
managers need to consider when inferring individual performance based on group output.  
While the aforementioned studies on group attribution concerned ways in which a group 
decision affects the observer’s impressions of everyone in the group, this context differs 
in that observers are required to partition credit of the group output between the situation 
(i.e., the group) and the individual to infer the target person’s creativity.  Under such a 
paradigm, decades of research on the FAE suggests that observers will insufficiently 
discount individual ability when the individual performs as part of a group.   
To understand the tendency for dispositional inferences, Gilbert and Osborne 
(1986) proposed a model where observers went through three stages to infer the behavior 
of others: categorization of behavior, characterization of actor, and correction for 
situation.  Similar to anchoring and adjustment, observers identified the behavior (“Min is 
acting nervous”), drew dispositional inferences (“Min is a nervous person”) and corrected 
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these inferences based on situational information in which the behavior occurred (“Min is 
probably more nervous than usual because he is about to give an important 
presentation”.)  The key feature of this model was that the three stages varied in the 
amount of cognitive load required for processing: the first two stages were relatively 
simple and effortless whereas the correction stage demanded more cognitive load.  By the 
principle of least effort, observers quickly formed dispositional impressions and 
insufficiently corrected behavior for situation.  Previous studies have shown that 
observers who lack cognitive resources or motivation display the correspondence bias.  
For example, Gilbert, McNulty, Giuliano and Benson (1992) showed that when the 
behavior was made obscure by distorting its visual or acoustical parameters, observers 
spent more cognitive effort in interpreting and characterizing the behavior of the actor 
from the video or the audio tape and made more correspondent inferences as a result.  
Moreover, Webster (1993) demonstrated that high need for cognition is associated with 
deeper analytic processing whereas high need for cognitive closure motivates people to 
terminate analytic processing.  Therefore, observers who are low in need for cognition 
and high in need for cognitive closure are more likely to display correspondent inferences 
due to insufficient correction of the initial dispositional attribution.  
As described, observers are likely to take the simplest cue available to infer 
behavior unless the situational context is made clear for processing.  In this regard, 
previous studies have shown that observers pay more attention to situational cues when 
the situational salience is increased.  For example, Choi and Nisbett (1998) tested the 
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correspondence bias across cultures (American and Korean) using the same attitude 
attribution paradigm (Jones & Harris, 1967).  As expected, all participants displayed the 
correspondence bias regardless of culture even when they knew that essayists were 
randomly assigned to, rather than chose, a position to either support or defend capital 
punishment.  However, in their second study, they increased the situational salience by 
assigning participants to write essays prior to judging an essay written under the same 
condition.  In this scenario, Korean participants showed a decrease in correspondence 
bias when they went through the same experience the essayists had.  Moreover, Moore, 
Swift, Sharek and Gino (2010) had participants make admission decisions to an MBA 
program based on clear and quantified information about the behavior (student GPA) and 
the situation (grading leniency: average GPA of the university.)  When the average GPA 
of the university increased for a given student GPA, participants discounted the grading 
leniency more from the nominal performance.  
When observers form impressions of individual creativity based on group output, 
one way of increasing the situational salience is to visually manipulate whom the target 
person is evaluated with.  Previous research has shown that visual manipulation of 
situational salience can alter patterns of attribution (Storms, 1973).  When the target is 
known to have worked in a group but is evaluated alone, I argue that observers will focus 
on the dispositional characteristics of the target as the basis for perceived creativity and 
therefore credit the target as if that person alone has made the product.  Since the target is 
being rated for group output, this is an error in attribution.  On the other hand, when the 
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target is rated with the presence of other members in the group, I argue that observers 
will partition credit between the group and the target. 
This difference in giving credit is similar to other cognitive psychological 
research on partitions.  Previous research on partition dependence has found that judged 
probabilities of the same event can vary depending on how the partition is framed.  For 
example, Fox and Rottenstreich (2003) had participants answer one of these two 
questions: “What is the probability that Sunday will be hotter than any other day next 
week” or “What is the probability that the hottest day of the week will be Sunday?”  
While the first question facilitates a two-fold partition (Sunday hotter, Sunday not hotter), 
the second question facilitates a seven-fold partition (Sunday is the hottest day of the 
week, Monday is the hottest day of the week, etc.)  As such, participants’ judgments in 
each case were biased toward the corresponding frame. 
In similar fashion, visual manipulation of whom the target is evaluated with can 
highlight different partitions.  In a four-person group, individual evaluation is likely to 
elicit a simple two-fold (target and rest of the group) partition where the target person 
receives sole creativity credit for the group output, leading to an error in attribution.  On 
the other hand, group evaluation can facilitate a four-fold partition, leading to a rational 
discounting of individual creativity. 
Hypothesis 4: When observers infer individual creativity based on group output, 
visual manipulation of evaluation context can elicit the fundamental attribution error: 
When the target is evaluated alone, observers will credit the target as if that person had 
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produced the output alone, leading to an error in attribution.  When the target is 
evaluated with others in the group, observers will partition credit between the situation 
(the group) and the target, leading to a discount of individual performance. 
In turn, I argue that the discounting of individual performance in a group 
evaluation context can either benefit or hurt the target’s perceived creativity depending 
on the objective quality of the group output.  With creative output, I expect to see a 
discounting of credit in how people perceive one’s creativity with the presence of others.  
With uncreative output, I expect a symmetric pattern of discounting blame: one’s lack of 
creativity would be discounted with the presence of others because observers would 
attribute the blame to the group.  In other words, the presence of others acts as a buffer 
for individual credit or blame as the group becomes an additional target for attribution.  
Hypothesis 5a: For producing objectively creative group output, observers will 
spread the credit and the target will be perceived to be less creative when he is evaluated 
with the group (compared to when he is evaluated alone.) 
Hypothesis 5b: For producing objectively uncreative group output, observers will 
spread the blame and the target will be perceived to be more creative when he is 
evaluated with the group (compared to when he is evaluated alone.) 
In the next two chapters I will present the results from six studies that tested the 
aforementioned hypotheses on both the evaluation of group output in demographically 
diverse group (Chapter 2) and on perceived individual creativity in group settings 
(Chapter 3.)  
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Chapter 2. The Diversity Bonus and Penalty in Assessment of Group Output 
2.1 Study 1 
In Study 1, participants were shown a photo of a demographically diverse or 
homogeneous group and told that the people in the photo were a design group that 
created logos for a logo design contest.  Participants reported how creative they expected 
logos to be from the design group, and then rated the creativity of three logos attributed 
to the group.  All participants saw the same three logos which were pre-tested to be high 
in creativity.  In order to manipulate the salience of demographic diversity, subjects were 
asked to provide ratings of gender and race diversity based on the group photo either at 
the beginning of the study (before forming expectations and rating logos) or at the end of 
the study.  I predicted that participants would expect the demographically diverse group 
to be more creative when diversity was salient (Hypothesis 2) and, as a result, the same 
logos would be rated to be more creative when they were assigned to the diverse group as 
a result of assimilation to the high expectation (Hypothesis 3a.)  
Method 
Participants. Six-hundred twenty-nine participants (339 females, 290 males) from 
an online pool (Age: M = 28.63, SD = 4.89) were randomly selected to one of four 
conditions in a 2 (Group diversity: Diverse vs. Homogeneous) X 2 (Remind diversity: 
Yes vs. No) between-subject design.   
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Instructions and procedures. Participants were told to imagine that they were a 
manager at a design firm and that they would be evaluating a design group across various 
dimensions.  After reading the introduction, they were shown a photo of either a 
demographically diverse or homogeneous group of four industrial designers.  
As shown in Figure 1, four types of homogeneous group photos were taken: four 
Asian females, four Asian males, four Caucasian females and four Caucasian males.  
Next, two demographically diverse groups of four were created by selecting individuals 
from the homogeneous groups in new combinations consisting of one Asian female, one 
Asian male, one Caucasian female, and one Caucasian male.  In comparing between each 
homogeneous and heterogeneous group, there always was one person who appeared in 
both homogeneous and diverse group photos and this person will be referred to as the 
target person for the remainder of the paper.  This allowed us to measure perceptions of 
individual creativity with the same target person in different group compositions.  
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Figure 1: Summary diagram of the four homogeneous and diverse groups with the target 
person (denoted by the dotted circle) in both groups 
All pictures were also rated by a separate group of participants.  As desired, there 
was a significant difference between diverse and homogeneous group pictures on 
dimensions related to diversity (gender and race) but not on dimensions unrelated to 
diversity (attractiveness.) 
Participants were informed that the group of industrial designers in the photo 
created company logos for its next project.  In the high-salience condition, participants 
rated group diversity on demographic dimensions (gender and race) using a 7-point scale 
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(1 = not diverse, 7 = very diverse) at the beginning of the study whereas participants in 
the low-salience condition rated these dimensions at the end of the study.  These ratings 
were designed to make group diversity salient in the high-salience condition and also 
served as a manipulation check1.  
Next, all participants provided an expected creativity rating for the group by 
indicating how creative they expected the group’s logos to be on a 100-point scale (0 = 
not creative, 50 = moderately creative, 100 = very creative.)  After indicating their 
expectation, participants used the same scale to rate three company logos attributed to the 
group in counter-balanced orders. Ten actual company logos (consisting of words and 
pictures) selected from online were rated by a separate group of participants in a pre-test.  
Three logos with similar and high rating of creativity were selected as stimuli (Appendix 
A.) 
After rating the logos, participants were told that the target person in the photo 
was a candidate for a position in their design firm and were asked to rate the perceived 
creativity of the target person based on the logos that he or she created as a part of the 
group.  They were informed that everyone in the group contributed equally. Participants 
used the same 100-point creativity scale as before.  Lastly, they indicated on a 100-point 
                                                
1 A 2 (Group Diversity: diverse vs. homogeneous) X 2 (Remind diversity: yes vs. 
no) ANOVA on ratings of diversity confirmed that people perceived the diverse group 
photos as more diverse across dimensions of gender, F(1, 625) = 1582.14, p < .0001, and 
race, F(1, 625) = 662.73, p < .0001.  There was no significant interaction between 
reminding diversity and group diversity for both ratings of diversity, F(1, 625) < 1.0, p = 
ns 
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scale (0= not likely to hire, 100= very likely to hire) how likely they would be to hire the 
target person.   
Results 
Previous research on creativity stereotypes has found only weak evidence for 
gender or race bias in creativity assessment (Kaufman, Baer, et al., 2010; Kaufman, Niu, 
Sexton, & Cole, 2010).  Consistent with these past results, there was no significant 
difference in measured variables between the four homogeneous groups, F(3, 310) < 1, p 
= ns, so all remaining results were aggregated.   
 Expected creativity. A two (Group Diversity: diverse vs. homogeneous) X 2 
(Remind diversity: Yes vs. No) between-subject analysis of variance (ANOVA) on 
expected creativity revealed a main effect of group diversity (diverse: M = 72.10, SD = 
17.48; homogeneous: M = 65.74, SD = 20.6), F(1, 625) = 7.44, p = .007, and this effect 
was qualified by the predicted interaction with reminding diversity, F(1, 625) = 7.39, p = 
.007.  When participants rated diversity at the beginning of the study and degree of 
diversity was made salient, demographically diverse groups were expected to be more 
creative (M = 73.38, SD = 16.74) than homogeneous groups (M = 63.14, SD = 20.34); 
this difference in expected creativity was much smaller when diversity was not salient 
(diverse: M = 70.7, SD = 18.22; homogeneous: M = 68.46, SD = 20.59) and this provided 
support for Hypothesis 2.  
Average logo creativity. The same 2 (Group Diversity: heterogeneous vs. 
homogeneous) X 2 (Remind diversity: Yes vs. No) between-subject ANOVA was 
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performed on the average creativity ratings of the three logos since the Cronbach’s alpha 
was 0.8.  It yielded a main effect of group diversity (diverse: M = 60.99, SD = 17.57; 
homogeneous: M = 57.03, SD = 18.69), F(1, 625) = 7.11, p = .008, but as predicted, the 
effect of diversity was qualified by a significant interaction between group diversity and 
reminding diversity, F(1, 625) = 5.47, p = .02 (see Fig. 2.)  As predicted by Hypothesis 
3a, when participants rated the demographic diversity of the group before rating the logos 
(and therefore were aware of the group diversity), they rated the logos attributed to the 
demographically diverse group as more creative than the same logos attributed to the 
homogeneous group.  When diversity was not made salient, participants rated the logos 
as similar in creativity for both groups.  
 
Figure 2: The average rating of logo creativity as a function of group diversity and 
reminding diversity 
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Perceived target creativity. The same 2 (Group Diversity: heterogeneous vs. 
homogeneous) X 2 (Remind diversity: Yes vs. No) between-subject ANOVA was 
performed on perceptions of target person’s creativity, yielding a main effect of group 
diversity (heterogeneous: M = 63.19, SD = 18.42; homogeneous: M = 60.03, SD = 19.39), 
F(1, 625) = 4.16, p = .042, and a significant interaction between group diversity and 
reminding diversity, F(1, 625) = 5.26, p = .022 (see Fig. 3.)  
 
Figure 3: Perception of target creativity as a function of group diversity and 
reminding diversity 
Hiring intention. The same 2 (Group Diversity: heterogeneous vs. homogeneous) 
X 2 (Remind diversity: Yes vs. No) between-subject ANOVA performed on hiring 
intention revealed a marginally significant effect of group diversity (heterogeneous: M = 
63.62, SD = 21.09; homogeneous: M = 60.54, SD = 20.39), F(1, 625) = 3.18, p = .075, 
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and a significant interaction between group diversity and reminding diversity, F(1, 625) = 
5.51, p = .02 (see Fig. 4.)  
 
 
Figure 4: Hiring intention of the target as a function of group diversity and 
reminding diversity 
In assessing both individual creativity and hiring intention, participants rated the 
target person in the diverse group to be more creative and more likely to be hired 
compared to the same person in the homogeneous group when the group diversity was 
reminded; this difference was greatly reduced when group diversity was not reminded.   
2.2 Study 2 
Study 1 showed that when demographic diversity is salient, people expected 
diverse groups to be more creative, and then assimilated creative logos to that expectation.  
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Study 2 was designed to build on Study 1 in several ways.  First, Study 2 was designed to 
make diversity salient in a more subtle way.  Unlike Study 1, Study 2 asked for ratings of 
diversity only at the end of the study as a manipulation check.  To make diversity salient 
in a more implicit way, subjects were presented with two groups simultaneously: one 
diverse and one homogeneous.  I expected that evaluating the groups side-by-side would 
make diversity automatically salient.  Next, in order to explore the mechanism behind the 
diversity bonus effect, participants answered a questionnaire designed to measure two 
aspects of the group process.  First, they were asked about the cognitive diversity of the 
group.  I predicted that the demographically diverse group would be perceived as having 
more cognitive diversity (Hypothesis 1.)  However, an alternative explanation of the 
bonus observed in Study 1 also existed: Observers would hold a more favorable 
impression of the demographically diverse group in general and this halo effect in turn 
would lead to higher creativity evaluation.  To address this concern, participants also 
answered questions about other group qualities such as group affect (e.g., how they feel 
about each other) and group execution (e.g., how well they meet work deadlines).  I 
predicted that observers would perceive the demographically diverse group as having 
more cognitive diversity but see no difference in other group qualities compared to 
homogeneous groups, and only the difference in perceived cognitive diversity would 
mediate the effect of demographic diversity on the evaluation of group output.  
Method 
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Participants. One-hundred fifty-one participants (81 males, 70 females) from an 
online pool (Age: M = 38.13, SD = 8.14) were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions (Group diversity: Diverse vs. Homogeneous) between-subject design2.   
Instructions and procedures. In the beginning, participants were told that they 
would be judging a company logo created by a group of industrial designers (Out of three 
highly creative company logos used in Study 1, the “martini house” logo was selected for 
this study.)  Next, to make demographic diversity salient, they were shown a photo of 
demographically diverse group and a photo of homogeneous group.  While the same four 
homogeneous group photos from Study 1 were used, different sets of people were used to 
form two diverse groups (Appendix D.)  All pictures were rated by a separate group of 
participants and yielded significant differences on dimensions related to diversity (gender 
and race) and no differences on dimensions unrelated to diversity (attractiveness.)  
Next, one of the two group photos was randomly chosen and participants 
answered questions about this group.  First, they were asked to rate the logo that the 
group created on three dimensions using a 9-point scale: usefulness (1 = not useful, 5 = 
moderately useful, 9= very useful), novelty (1 = not novel, 5 = moderately novel, 9 = very 
novel) and creativity (1 = not creative, 5 = moderately creative, 9 = very creative.)  
Second, they rated the group on cognitive diversity on four items (Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.87) and other group qualities on five items (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.89) on a 9-
                                                
2 Similar to Study 1, four homogeneous and two diverse group photos were used (which 
were later aggregated) and the original study design had six cells with 25 subjects in each 
cell. 
 30 
 
point scale (Appendix E).  Lastly, as a manipulation check, participants rated diversity of 
both groups on demographic dimensions (gender and race) using a 9-point scale (1 = not 
diverse, 5 = moderately diverse, 9 = very diverse.)3 
Results 
As in Study 1, there was no significant difference in measured variables between 
the four homogeneous groups, F(3, 74) < 2.0, p = ns, so all remaining results were 
aggregated.   
Overall creativity rating. The overall creativity rating was computed by averaging 
usefulness, novelty and creativity of the logo since the Cronbach’s alpha was 0.81.  A 
one-way (Group diversity: diverse vs. homogeneous) between-subject ANOVA on the 
overall creativity rating revealed an expected main effect of group diversity, F(1, 149) = 
8.69, p <  .001, with the same logo being rated as more creative when it is attributed to 
the demographically diverse group (M = 7.01, SD = 1.51) compared to the homogeneous 
group (M = 6.22, SD = 1.77). 
Group Process. Since participants provided measures of both cognitive diversity 
and other group qualities, a 2 (Group diversity: diverse vs. homogeneous) X 2(Group 
process items: cognitive diversity vs. other group qualities) mixed ANOVA was 
performed with the first factor manipulated between-subject and the second factor within-
                                                
3 A one-way (Group diversity: diverse vs. homogeneous) within-subject ANOVA on 
ratings of diversity revealed that participants saw the diverse group photos as more 
diverse across dimensions of gender, F(1, 362) = 683.18, p < .001, and race , F(1, 362) = 
475.33, p < .001.   
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subject.  The ANOVa revealed a main effect of the group process items, F(1, 296) = 
57.91, p <  .001, with participants giving a higher score on other group qualities (M = 
6.32, SD = 1.51) compared to the ratings of cognitive diversity (M = 5.71, SD = 1.75).  
As predicted, the ANOVA also yielded a significant interaction, F(1, 296) = 28.07, p <  
.001.  Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the demographically diverse group (M = 6.06, SD = 
1.73) was perceived to have more cognitive diversity compared to the homogeneous 
group (M = 5.38, SD = 1.73), F(1, 296) = 11.57, p <  .001, while participants saw no 
difference in other group qualities between the diverse (M = 6.41. SD = 1.52) and 
homogeneous group (M = 6.24, SD = 1.50), F(1, 296) < 1.0, p = ns. 
Meditation.  Both cognitive diversity and other group qualities were separately 
tested as mediators for the direct effect of demographic diversity on perceived creativity 
of group output, but only cognitive diversity significantly mediated this relationship.  As 
shown in Figure 5, the indirect effect is positive (ab > 0) and the 95% confidence interval 
(10,000 bootstrap samples) excludes zero (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).  The ratio of the 
indirect to the total effect, ab/(ab + c′), is 46%, suggesting that cognitive diversity 
explains a significant portion of the diversity effect.  The mediation also indicates a 
remaining direct effect of demographic diversity.   
Participants who rated a demographically diverse group indicated that this group 
had more cognitive diversity compared to those who rated a homogeneous group and the 
difference in perceived cognitive diversity in turn led to higher creativity ratings when 
the same logo was attributed to the diverse group.  In other words, participants believed 
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that members of diverse group had more perspectives and could brainstorm more unique 
ideas for the logo compared to the homogeneous group and this belief led them to 
evaluate the output from the diverse group as more creative.  The alternative explanation 
that a halo effect would lead to higher scores of creativity was ruled out as participants 
did not hold more favorable impression of the diverse group on other group qualities such 
as group affect and execution.   
 
Figure 5: Mediation model in Study 2 
2.3 Study 3 
Study 3 builds on the first two studies in the following ways.  First, while Study 1 
and Study 2 only included logos that were perceived as creative and interesting, Study 3 
included both a highly creative and an uncreative logo.  I expected to replicate the finding 
from the first two studies that a highly creative logo from the diverse group would be 
seen as more creative than the same logo attributed to homogeneous groups (Hypothesis 
3a.)  In addition, I wanted to test whether an uncreative logo from the heterogeneous 
group would show a contrast effect.  I expected that, due to high expectations and clear 
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disconfirmation, a dull and uncreative logo attributed to a diverse group would actually 
be rated as less creative than the same logo when it was attributed to a homogeneous 
group (Hypothesis 3b.)  
Second, Study 1 asked all participants to rate expected creativity for the design 
group in advance of judging the logos.  I wanted to test whether forming an explicit 
expectation was a necessary intervening step in the predicted patterns of assimilation and 
contrast for heterogeneous groups.  In Study 3, half the subjects were asked to rate 
expected creativity after seeing the groups but before judging the logos; the other half 
were not asked to rate expected creativity.  I could then test whether the predicted pattern 
of assimilation and contrast would hold even in the absence of forming an explicit 
expectation.  Finally, in line with the traditional research on creativity (Amabile, 1996), I 
used a broader measure of creativity by asking subjects to rate novelty, usefulness, and 
creativity as three separate measures.  
Method 
Participants. One-thousand two-hundred forty-one participants (612 males, 629 
females) from an online pool (Age: M = 34.53, SD = 7.72) were randomly assigned to 
one of eight conditions in a 2 (Group diversity: Diverse vs. Homogeneous) X 2 (Logo 
type: Highly creative vs. Uncreative) X 2 (Formed expectation: Yes vs. No) between-
subject design.   
Instructions and procedures. Participants were told that they would be judging 
company logos created by two groups for a design contest and were shown one photo of a 
 34 
 
demographically diverse group and one photo of a homogeneous group.  While the same 
homogeneous group photos from Study 1 were used, different sets of people were used to 
form two diverse groups (Appendix D.)  All pictures were rated by a separate group of 
participants and yielded significant differences on dimensions related to diversity (gender 
and race) and no differences on dimensions unrelated to diversity (attractiveness.)  
In the formed expectation condition, participants were asked to rate the expected 
creativity for the logo designed by each group across three dimensions on a 7-point scale: 
usefulness (1 = not useful, 4 = moderately useful, 7= very useful), novelty (1 = not novel, 
4 = moderately novel, 7 = very novel) and creativity (1 = not creative, 4 = moderately 
creative, 7 = very creative.)  For completeness, I asked participants in the no-expectation 
condition near the end of the experiment to recall how useful, novel and creative they 
initially expected the logos to be when they first saw the group photos.4 
Next, participants rated a logo from each group on usefulness, novelty and 
creativity using the same scale.  In one condition, the highly creative logo was assigned 
to the demographically diverse group and the uncreative logo was assigned to the 
homogeneous group with the opposite assignment in the other condition.  The order in 
which they rated the logos was counterbalanced.  Through a pre-test of 15 logos, two 
logos were selected, one that received the highest rating of creativity and the other that 
                                                
4 As in Study 1, subjects expected the diverse group to be more creative than the 
homogeneous group.  This pattern held when expectations were reported early in the 
study (after seeing the group photos but before seeing the logos) or recalled at the end of 
the study (all ps < .001).   
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received the lowest (Appendix B.)  Lastly, as a manipulation check, participants rated 
diversity of both groups on demographic dimensions (gender and race) using a 7-point 
scale (1 = not diverse, 7 = very diverse.)5 
Results 
Two things are noted for the analysis.  First, in addition to the three between-
subject factors described above (the demographic diversity of the group photo, the 
objective quality of the logo and when they provided expectations of creativity for each 
group), our study design also yielded a within-subject factor because each participant 
provided a rating of expectation and logo creativity for both the diverse and 
homogeneous group, resulting in two responses per measure.  To avoid interpreting a 
four-way ANOVA, we focused on the first response that each participant provided.  
Since the order in which participants rated the diverse and homogeneous groups was 
counterbalanced, analyzing the first responses provided a pure between-subject analysis 
of the two measures; note that a more complex analysis adding a within-subject variable 
for the second logo yielded identical conclusions.  Second, similar to Study 1, the four 
homogeneous groups were aggregated after confirming that participants perceived no 
                                                
5 A 2 (Group Diversity: diverse vs. homogeneous) X 2 (Logo Type: highly creative vs. 
uncreative) X 2 (Formed Expectation: yes vs. no) between-subject ANOVA on ratings of 
diversity revealed that participants saw diverse group photos as more diverse across 
dimensions of gender, F(1, 1233) = 2571.31, p < .0001, and race , F(1, 1233) = 1163.63, 
p < .0001.  There were no significant interactions between independent variables, F(1, 
1233) < 1.0, p = ns. 
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difference in creativity ratings across the different homogeneous groups, F(1, 1233) < 
1.0, ns.  
Overall creativity rating. The overall creativity rating was computed by averaging 
usefulness, novelty and creativity of the logo since the Cronbach’s alpha was 0.91.  A 2 
(Group Diversity: diverse vs. heterogeneous) X 2 (Logo Type: highly creative vs. 
uncreative) X 2 (Formed Expectation: yes vs. no) between-subject ANOVA on the 
overall creativity rating revealed an expected main effect of logo type, F(1, 1233) = 
672.68, p <  .0001, with the highly creative logo being rated more highly (M = 5.1, SD = 
1.4) than the uncreative logo (M = 3.12, SD = 1.32) and an unexpected main effect of 
forming a creativity expectation, F(1, 1233) = 11.83, p <  .001, such that participants who 
formed an expectation gave a higher rating of creativity (M = 4.24, SD = 1.7) than those 
who did not (M = 4.03, SD = 1.66.)  
The main effect of logo type was qualified by a significant interaction between 
group diversity and logo type, F(1, 1233) = 23.06, p <  .0001 (see Fig. 5.) Replicating the 
pattern in Study 1, participants rated the highly creative logo as more creative when it 
was attributed to the demographically diverse group than to the homogeneous group, 
consistent with assimilating expectation-consistent output to a high expectation.  As 
predicted by Hypothesis 3b, however, participants rated the uncreative logo as less 
creative when it was attributed to the diverse group than to the homogeneous group, 
consistent with contrasting expectation-inconsistent output away from a high expectation.  
This interaction held regardless of whether subjects formed an expectation about group 
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creativity before or after evaluating the logos.  Specifically, the interaction between logo 
type and diversity in Figure 6 held when subjects formed an initial expectation, F(1, 599) 
= 10.81, p < .001 and when they did not, F(1, 634) = 12.30, p <  .001.  Demographically 
diverse groups received a creativity bonus for a highly creative logo and a creativity 
penalty for an uncreative logo even when participants formed no initial expectation.  
Lastly, the three-way interaction was not significant, F(1, 1233) < 1.0 , p = ns.  
 
Figure 6: Overall rating of logo creativity as a function of group diversity and 
logo type 
2.4 Study 4 
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Study 4 was an exploratory study designed to extend this lay theory to perceptions of the 
individual member in a diverse group.  Unlike Study 1 that looked at the spill-over effect 
of group evaluation to perceptions of individual group members, Study 4 studied the 
direct consequence of being featured in a diverse group for how individual members are 
perceived by observers. 
Similar to the previous studies, participants in this study were shown a photo of 
either demographically diverse or homogeneous group and there was one person (i.e., the 
target person) who appeared in both group photos.  Participants were further told that the 
company logo was made by this target person alone and made judgments about his 
creativity.  In this setup, two competing hypotheses are proposed: A rational account 
predicting that observers should subtract out any information about the group and 
perceive no differences in individual creativity on the product attributed to the individual 
working alone.  However, the group’s demographic diversity could also influence the 
evaluation of the target.  In this case, I expected that a lay theory of diversity would spill 
over to the individual member in the group and the target person would receive more 
positive evaluation of creativity when shown in a diverse group even though the output 
was based on individual effort.  Furthermore, similar to Study 2, I predicted that the 
target person would be perceived as personally possessing more cognitive diversity when 
featured in a diverse group and this in turn would influence the rating of target creativity.   
Method 
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Participants. One-hundred ninety-nine participants (98 males, 101 females) from 
an online pool (Age: M = 36.70, SD = 8.98) were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions in a 2 (Group diversity: Demographically diverse vs. Homogeneous) X 2 
(Logo type: Highly creative vs. Uncreative) between-subject design.   
Instructions and procedures. To make degree of demographic diversity salient, 
participants were first shown a photo of an industrial design group that was either 
demographically diverse or homogeneous and they rated this group on gender and racial 
diversity on a 9-point scale (1 = not diverse, 5 = moderately diverse, 9 = very diverse.) 
The two group photos from Study 1 were used where the same person appeared in both 
diverse and homogeneous group.  Participants were informed that this group creates 
company logos together or individually depending on the project and that they would be 
answering questions about the target person.  In the next screen, they were shown either a 
creative or uncreative company logo, told that the target person created this logo alone 
and rated this person’s creativity on a 100-point scale (1= not creative, 50 = moderately 
creative, 100= very creative).  Next, items from Study 2 were adapted that asked 
participants to rate cognitive diversity and other personal qualities of the target person 
(Appendix F).    
Results 
Target person creativity. A two (Group Diversity: diverse vs. heterogeneous) X 2 
(Logo Type: highly creative vs. uncreative) between-subject ANOVA on the target 
person creativity yielded a main effect of group diversity, F(1, 195) = 4.90, p =  .03, with 
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the same person being rated as more creative when he was shown in a demographically 
diverse group (M = 61.33, SD = 24.28) compared to a homogeneous group (M = 54.82, 
SD = 23.58), and a main effect of logo type, F(1, 195) = 58.75, p <  .001, with the same 
person being rated as more creative for producing a creative logo (M = 69.65, SD = 
19.96) than an uncreative logo (M = 46.68, SD = 22.45).  The interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 195) < 1.0, p =  ns.   
Cognitive diversity of target person. The four cognitive diversity items were 
averaged since Cronbach’s alpha was 0.88.  The same ANOVA on the target person’s 
cognitive diversity yielded a same pattern of result: a main effect of group diversity, F(1, 
195) = 3.57, p =  .05, with the same person being perceived as having more cognitive 
diversity when he was shown in a demographically diverse group (M = 5.59, SD = 1.65) 
than a homogeneous group (M = 5.19, SD = 1.35), and a main effect of logo type, F(1, 
195) = 8.82, p <  .01, with the same person being rated as having more cognitive diversity 
for producing a creative logo (M = 5.72, SD = 1.42) than an uncreative logo (M = 5.08, 
SD = 1.56).  Again, the interaction was not significant, F(1, 195) < 1.0, p =  ns. 
Other personal qualities. The four personal quality items were averaged since 
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.89. The same ANOVA on the target person’s other personal 
qualities yielded a main effect of group diversity, F(1, 195) = 4.93, p =  .03, and this 
means participants viewed the same person as more favorable across personable 
dimensions  (e.g., “how much do you think members of this group like him?”) when he 
was shown in a demographically diverse group (M = 6.43, SD = 1.42) than a 
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homogeneous group (M = 6.01, SD = 1.31).  The main effect of logo type and the 
interaction were not significant, F(1, 195) < 1.0, p =  ns.   
Mediation.  Both cognitive diversity and other personal qualities were separately 
tested for meditation on the direct effect of demographic diversity on perceived target 
creativity and they were both significant6.  As such, both were tested together in a 
structural equation model with each factor as independent path that mediates the direct 
effect of demographic diversity on perceived target creativity and only the path with 
cognitive diversity remained significant.  The ratio of the indirect to the total effect, 
ab/(ab + c′), is 70% and cognitive diversity alone accounts for 92% of this mediated 
effect. 
As shown in Figure 7, participants who rated the target in a demographically 
diverse group indicated that he had more cognitive diversity compared to those who rated 
the same person in a homogeneous group and the difference in perceived cognitive 
diversity of the target in turn led to higher individual creativity rating.  In other words, 
participants believed that the target possessed more perspectives and could brainstorm 
more unique ideas for the logo alone as a result of being surrounded by a diverse set of 
people and this belief led them to evaluate the target as more creative.  Although 
observers also viewed the target as more favorable on other personal qualities when 
                                                
6 The ratio of the indirect to the total effect, ab/(ab + c′), is 66% in a mediated model with 
cognitive diversity as a single mediator and the ratio of the indirect to the total effect, 
ab/(ab + c′), is 48% in a mediated model with other personal qualities as a single 
mediator. 
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featured in a diverse group, this difference only accounted for a small and insignificant 
portion of the mediated effect. 
Results indicate that a lay theory of diversity can influence impressions of the 
individual in the diverse group and there are two possible explanations for this.  First, 
simply surrounding the target with demographically diverse group members (who were 
previously found to be more creative as a group) could have made the target appear more 
creative and therefore the mere presence of demographic diversity could have primed 
creativity.  Second, observers could have held a more elaborate theory about individual 
creativity in a diverse group.  They could have believed that an individual benefits by 
interacting with a diverse group of people or that the type of person who self-selects into 
a diverse group holds more creative traits.  The current study does not offer a clear 
conclusion about the cause of this effect.  Future studies will be needed to separate a 
simple priming explanation from an explanation based on inferences about how 
individual’s differ when they are members of diverse or homogeneous groups.  
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Figure 7: Mediation model in Study 4   
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Chapter 3. Credit and Blame for Creative Performance in a Group Setting  
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 fit under the large umbrella of investigating the effects of 
social setting on perception of creativity but differ in their focuses.  Studies in Chapter 2 
tests people’s lay theory that demographically diverse groups are more creative and 
demonstrates how the knowledge about demographic composition influences an 
observer’s perception of creativity.  While the focus of Chapter 2 has been on the lay 
theory of diversity, Chapter 3 explores how observers form impression of individual 
creativity based on group output.  Previous research has showed that allocating individual 
responsibility from group output is a challenging task.  For example, Savitsky, Van 
Boven, Epley and Wight (2005) demonstrated that members of a group often estimate 
their own contribution to group output in a self-serving way.   
In line with this, Chapter 3 aims to provide evidence that observers of the group 
can also commit biases when inferring individual creativity from group work when the 
group contribution is not psychologically salient to the observer.  For example, Steve 
Jobs was widely regarded as a creative genius.  He had a great eye for elegant design and 
seamless integration.  Everyone knows that he invented the iPhone, the iPod, and the 
Mac.  Of course such a claim is fundamentally wrong.  Sophisticated products must have 
required the effort of many, and the genius of Apple was a system – rather than an 
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individual – that sought and generated ideas and then engineered ways to have them work 
together.  Thus, one needs to consider not only Steve Jobs’ personal creativity, but also 
the situational factors (such as the creative contributions received from many others like 
Jonathan Ive, the senior vice president of industrial design at Apple) to explain Jobs’ 
success.  However, average consumers may make direct inferences about Jobs’ creativity 
based on their impressions of the iPhone without considering the role played by countless 
contributors such as Ive.  This tendency is consistent with many past studies on the 
fundamental attribution error or the correspondence bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross, 
1977), which demonstrate how people often rely too heavily on dispositional 
explanations to the neglect of situational factors as the causes of behavior.   
The social influence in judgment of creativity warrants attention because many 
major projects require the effort of groups.  In such settings, understanding how 
observers partition creativity credit between the target person and the group warrants 
attention because impressions of individual creativity can have significant implications 
for the organization.  For example, when people outside the company saw Jobs as 
Apple’s only idea man, it upset Jonathan Ive because that made them “vulnerable as a 
company” (Isaacson, 2011).  His assertion was later confirmed when Apple stocks 
dwindled as a function of Jobs’ struggling health in the later years of his tenure as CEO 
(Collingwood, 2009).   
The present research adds value to the literature by exploring the effect of the 
social context in a subjective assessment of individual creativity.  Two studies were 
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designed where participants rated the creativity of the target alone or with other members 
of the group.  In Study 5, participants rated Jonathan Ive’s creativity based on either a 
photo of him alone or a photo of him within a group of Apple designers.  For designing 
the same creative Apple products, they were predicted to discount his performance and 
rate him as less creative when he evaluated in a group context compared to being rated 
alone.  Study 6 built on Study 5 by using objectively creative (e.g., a well-designed and 
interesting company logo) and uncreative (e.g., a clearly dull and unimaginative company 
logo) group output.  I predicted that observers’ perceptions of the target creativity in a 
group evaluation will cost the target when the output is objectively creative (via the 
spreading of credit) and benefit the person when the output is clearly disappointing (via 
the spreading of blame.)   
3.2 Study 5 
In Study 5, participants were asked questions about Jonathan Ive’s creativity for 
the Apple products that he and his team designed.  In answering these questions, they 
were either shown a photo of Jonathan Ive either alone or in a group with members of the 
actual design team (Appendix G.)  This allowed us to measure people’s perception of his 
creativity with or without the presence of others in the group.  For the team photos, the 
demographic diversity of the team was also varied to create homogeneous (four 
Caucasian males) and heterogeneous (Asian female, Asian male, Caucasian female, 
Caucasian male) teams. 
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With the three different photos of Jonathan Ive (one individual photo and two 
team photos), two predictions were made.  Firstly, for designing the same Apple products 
which are generally regarded as innovative, participants would rate him as less creative 
when he was assessed in a group because the presence of others would increase the 
situational salience and observers would partition creativity credit between the group and 
the target (Hypothesis 5a).   
Next, two types of group photos were used.  In Study 1, observers rated the target 
as more creative for the same group output when he or she was a part of a 
demographically diverse group compared to a homogeneous group.  However, 
participants in that study first evaluated the logo as a function of group diversity which in 
turn affected the rating of the target (i.e., group diversity à perceived creativity of group 
output à perceived target creativity).  In this study, instead of rating the group output, 
participants were given a score to hold constant their beliefs about the creativity of group 
output and thereby study the direct effect of group diversity on perceived target creativity 
(i.e. group diversity à perceived target creativity).  In such cases, I predicted that the two 
group photos would not elicit a difference in perceived creativity of Jonathan Ive.  
However, I predicted that there would be a significant difference between each type of 
group photo when compared to the individual photo, which would demonstrate the 
robustness of the visual salience effect. 
Method 
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Participants.  One-hundred seventy-four participants (95 females, 79 males) from 
an online pool (Age: M = 40.35, SD = 8.72) were randomly assigned to see one of three 
photos:  Ive alone vs. Ive in a demographically diverse group vs. Ive in a 
demographically homogeneous group.   
Instructions and procedures.  Participants were told that since 1996, Jonathan Ive 
has been head of the Apple design team that is responsible for designing major Apple 
products such as the iPod, iPhone, iPad, MacBook Pro, MacBook Air and iMac.  As 
such, it was implied that these gadgets are products of a group effort.  Next, they were 
shown one of three photos (Appendix G).  Participants in the weak visual salience 
condition were shown a photo of Jonathan Ive alone while those in the strong visual 
salience condition were shown a photo of Jonathan Ive in a four-person group with either 
demographically diverse or homogeneous group members.  From the actual Apple design 
team, which consists of 16 people, three members were selected based on their 
demographics: three Caucasian males for the demographically homogeneous group and 
an Asian female, an Asian male and a Caucasian female for the diverse group.  Every 
participant indicated that they knew who Jonathan Ive was prior to participating.    
With the photo, participants were asked how creative Jonathan Ive was based on 
the design of Apple products over the last decade on a 100-point scale (0 = not creative, 
50 = moderately creative, 100 = very creative).  As another measure of individual 
creativity, they were also asked how creative he would be if he were to work on a project 
designing the next major Apple product by himself.  While the first measure of creativity 
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allowed them to evaluate his creativity with or without the presence of others, the second 
measure forced people in every condition to isolate his individual creativity from the 
team.  Next, those who saw the demographically diverse or homogeneous group photos 
were asked to rate the team in terms of gender and race on a 7-point scale (1 = not 
diverse, 4 = moderately diverse, 7 = very diverse). As expected, there was a significant 
difference in perceived diversity on dimensions of gender (diverse: M = 5.32, SD = 1.39; 
homogeneous: M = 2.05, SD = 1.76), F(1, 140) = 150.19,  p < 0.0001, and race (diverse: 
M = 4.92, SD =1.42; homogeneous: M = 2.32, SD = 1.89) ,F(1, 140) = 86.04, p < 0.0001.  
Lastly, they were asked how much they liked Apple products on a 7-point scale (1 = I do 
not like Apple products at all, 7 = I like Apple products very much) and there was no 
difference between conditions, F(1, 171) < 1.0, p = ns. 
Results 
As predicted, there was no difference in rating of the measures between the two 
group conditions so they were aggregated, F(1,140) < 1.0, p = ns.   
Perceived individual creativity.  A one-way (Visual salience: Target alone vs. 
Target in a group) between-subject analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the first creativity 
measure revealed a significant main effect of visual salience, F(1, 172) = 5.07, p = .03.  
As predicted, for designing the same list of innovative Apple products, Jonathan Ive was 
rated to be significantly more creative when participants saw a photo of him alone (M = 
89.84, SD = 12.6) than when he was in a group (M = 80.74, SD = 22.04).   
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Perceived creative potential.  Next, the same ANOVA was performed on the 
second measure of target creativity (perceived creative potential) and it also yielded a 
main effect of visual salience, F(1,172) = 8.87, p < .01, such that participants believed 
Jonathan Ive would be more creative in designing the future Apple product by himself 
when he was shown by himself (M = 79.22, SD = 18.79) than in a group (M = 65.92, SD 
= 23.62).   
Using an example from the real world, this study demonstrated that observers 
change their perception of individual creativity based on group output as a function of the 
visual salience of the group.  For the designs of same Apple products, Jonathan Ive was 
perceived to be less creative when he was assessed in a photo that included other 
members of his design team.  Furthermore, participants who evaluated his creativity with 
the presence of others continued to use the initial impression in attributing his potential 
creativity in a future project by himself.  Lastly, although the two group photos did not 
elicit a difference in perceived creativity, there was a significant difference between each 
type of group photo when compared to the individual photo, which showcased the 
robustness of the visual salience effect. 
3.3 Study 6 
Study 5 displayed that observers perceive the target creativity differently when 
situational salience is manipulated visually.  Study 6 was designed to build on Study 5 in 
several ways.  First, participants in Study 5 made creativity attributions with the 
knowledge that Apple products are created by teams.  An interesting benchmark against 
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which to compare attributions in a team context is the attribution that would be made to 
an individual working alone.  As such, Study 6 used unfamiliar company logos as the 
output, which could then be credited to either a single person or a group.  This created a 
benchmark against which to precisely measure discounting in perceived individual 
creativity and I predicted that there would be no difference in the creativity rating of the 
target between this benchmark and when the output is attributed to a group as long as the 
target is shown alone.  In other words, I predicted that observers would credit the target 
as if that person had produced the group output alone when he is evaluated alone 
(Hypothesis 4).  Second, since Apple products are generally regarded as innovative, 
Study 3 could test attributions for just creative output.  Study 6 extended this original 
focus by asking people’s perception of one’s creativity for both creative and uncreative 
output.  Similar to Study 5, with creative output, I expected to see a discounting of credit 
in how people perceive one’s creativity with the presence of others (Hypothesis 5a).  
With uncreative output, I expected a symmetric pattern of discounting blame: one’s lack 
of creativity would be discounted with the presence of others because observers would 
attribute blame to the group (Hypothesis 5b).  Lastly, two group photos were used again 
to demonstrate the robustness of the visual salience effect.  In sum, in terms of visual 
salience, Study 6 included the three conditions in Study 5 where observers rated the 
target on group output based on one of three photos (target alone, target in a 
demographically diverse group and target in a homogeneous group) along with an 
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additional condition where observers rated the same target based on the assumption that 
the target person had created the product alone.  
Method 
Participants.  One-thousand two-hundred thirty-six participants (622 males, 692 
females) from an online pool (Age: M = 38.61, SD = 8.61) were randomly assigned to 
one of 12 conditions in a 4 (Visual salience: Target alone on individual output vs. Target 
alone on group output vs. Target in a demographically diverse group on group output vs. 
Target in a demographically homogeneous group on group output) X 3 (Logo Type: no 
logo vs. highly creative logo vs. uncreative logo) between-subject design.   
Instructions and procedures.  In this study, participants were either told that a 
group of four industrial designers or a single designer had created a company logo for a 
design contest.  Next, they were shown three items: the photo of the industrial designer or 
the group, the logo that he or they created and a score that it received from the panel of 
judges from the contest.   
Participants in the benchmark condition were told that the logo was created by the 
target alone and were shown a corresponding photo of the target.  Next, participants in 
the other three conditions were informed that the logo was created by a group of 
designers and were shown different photos of the target.  Similar to Study 5, those in the 
weak visual salience condition were shown a photo of the target alone while those in the 
strong visual salience were shown a group photo that was either demographically diverse 
or homogeneous with the target (Appendix H.) The three photos were created with the 
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same Caucasian appearing in all three: the target person alone, target person in a 
demographically homogeneous group (four Caucasian males) and a diverse group (Asian 
female, Asian male, Caucasian female and Caucasian male.)  All pictures were rated by a 
separate group of participants and yielded significant differences on dimensions related to 
diversity (gender and race) and no differences on dimensions unrelated to diversity 
(attractiveness.)    
In terms of the group output, there were three conditions.  In the control condition, 
participants were informed that the group or the target shown in the previous screen had 
created a company logo but the participants were not shown an actual image of the logo.  
Thus, their judgment was only based on the photo of the target or the group.  Participants 
in the other two conditions were shown either a highly creative logo or an uncreative 
company logo as the output and the same logos from Study 3 were used.  Lastly, to hold 
constant the observers’ impression of the group output, they were given a score for the 
creative (90 out of 100) and uncreative (40 out of 100) logos.  
Based on the output, participants were asked the same two questions of creativity 
as in Study 5.  Firstly, they were asked how creative they thought the target person was 
on a 100-point scale (0 = not creative, 50 = moderately creative, 100 = very creative).  As 
another measure of individual creativity, participants (except for those in the benchmark 
condition) were also asked how creative the target would be if he were to design another 
company logo by himself.  While the first measure of creativity allowed them to evaluate 
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target creativity with or without the presence of others, the second measure forced people 
in every condition to isolate his individual creativity from the team. 
Results 
Perceived target creativity.  A 4 (Visual salience of the group: Target alone on 
individual output vs. Target alone on group output vs. Target in a demographically 
homogeneous group on group output vs. Target in a demographically diverse group on 
group output) X 3 (Logo Type: No logo vs. Highly creative logo vs. Uncreative logo) 
between-subject ANOVA on perceived target creativity revealed an expected main effect 
of visual salience where group and individual photos of the target person yielded 
different ratings of creativity (Target alone on individual output: M = 56.42, SD = 26.10; 
Target alone on group output: M = 59.01, SD = 23.76; Target in a diverse group: M = 
62.92, SD = 18.37; Target in a homogeneous group: M = 59.37, SD = 18.87), F(3, 1224) 
= 6.67, p <  .001), and a main effect of logo type where the objective quality of the output 
affected how observers perceived the target person’s creativity (no logo: M = 60.85, SD = 
18.33; highly creative: M = 68.47, SD = 20.08; uncreative: M = 50.17, SD = 21.42;), F(2, 
1227) = 118.20, p <  .001.   
The key prediction of this study was an interaction between visual salience and 
logo type.  As predicted, this interaction was significant, F(6, 1227) = 12.49, p <  .001 
(see Fig. 6.)  Simple contrasts revealed a significant difference in perceived creativity 
between the four visual salience conditions for the highly creative, F(3, 1224) = 5.81, p < 
0.001, and uncreative logo, F(3, 1224) = 24.03, p < 0.001, but not when participants did 
 55 
 
not see a logo, F(3, 1224) = 1.63, p =ns.  As such, planned contrasts of visual salience 
were performed in the two conditions where participants saw an image of either a highly 
creative or an uncreative logo.   
Compared to being rated alone for the highly creative logo, participants rated the 
target person as less creative when he was shown in a demographically diverse, F(1, 
1224) = 3.74, p = .05, or homogeneous group, F(1, 1224) = 13.32, p < .001 (Hypothesis 
4a.)  The same person suffered further by being in a homogeneous group compared to a 
diverse group, F(1, 1224) = 3.91, p = .04.  Lastly, there was no difference in perceived 
creativity between the benchmark condition where the output was attributed to the target 
alone and the weak visual salience condition where the output was attributed to the 
group, F(1, 1224) < 1.0, p = ns.  In other words, as Hypothesis 4 predicted, when 
participants were shown a photo of the target alone, they rated the target as if the target 
had created the output alone even though they were informed that the highly creative logo 
was made by the group.   
 In contrast, for the uncreative company logo, the target person was rated to be 
more creative when shown in either a diverse, F(1, 1224) = 29.99, p < .001, or 
homogeneous group photo, F(1, 1224) = 23.24, p < .001, than when the participant 
viewed the photo of the target person alone (Hypothesis 5b).  However, the same person 
did not benefit further by being in a diverse group when compared to a homogeneous 
group, F(1, 1224) < 1.0, p = ns.  Lastly, there was no difference in perceived creativity 
between the benchmark condition and the weak visual salience condition when the output 
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was attributed to the target alone or when the output was attributed to the group, F(1, 
1224) < 1.0, p = ns.  Again, Hypothesis 4 was confirmed and participants rated the target 
as if the target had created the output alone even though they were informed that the 
uncreative logo was made by the group.   
 
Figure 8: Perceived creativity of the target as a function of visual salience and 
logo type 
Perceived creative potential.  The same ANOVA on the perceived creative 
potential of the target yielded a similar pattern of results: a marginally significant main 
effect of visual salience (Target alone on individual output: M = 59.82, SD = 24.10; 
Target alone on group output: M = 60.07, SD = 23.10; Target in a diverse group: M = 
63.01, SD = 18.71; Target in a homogeneous group: M = 60.08, SD = 19.67), F(3, 1224) 
= 2.35, p = .07, and a main effect of logo type (highly creative: M = 68.16, SD = 19.81; 
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uncreative: M = 52.63, SD = 20.97; no logo: M = 61.99, SD = 19.20), F(2, 1224) = 79.59, 
p <  .001.   
As Figure 9 shows, there was also a significant interaction between visual 
salience and logo type, F(6, 1227) = 7.39, p <  .001.  Simple contrasts revealed a 
significant difference in perceived creative potential of the target between the four visual 
salience conditions for highly creative, F(3, 1224) = 4.84, p < 0.01, and uncreative logo, 
F(3, 1224) = 10.99, p < 0.001, but not when participants did not see a logo, F(3, 1224) = 
1.23, p =ns.  
 
Figure 9: Perceived creative potential of the target on a future project as a 
function of visual salience and logo type 
When participants were asked to attribute the target’s creativity on a future project 
by himself, they displayed the same credit and blame for creative performance:  For the 
highly creative logo, being featured in either a demographically diverse, F(1, 1224) = 
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2.74, p = .05, or homogeneous group, F(1, 1224) = 6.54, p = .01, led to a lower rating of 
creative potential.  On the other hand, for the uncreative logo, being featured in either a 
demographically diverse, F(1, 1224) = 11.90, p = .001, or homogeneous group, F(1, 
1224) = 7.21, p < .01, lead to a higher rating.  Lastly, for both types of logos, participants 
again showed no difference in their beliefs about the target’s creative potential between 
the two conditions when output was attributed to either the target or the group, F(1, 1224) 
< 1.0, p = ns.  In other words, they largely ignored the effort of other group members and 
gave sole credit to the target when the target was featured alone.  
The study yielded two key results.  First, depending on the quality of group 
output, participants attributed less credit or the blame to the target individual when the 
group presence was made salient (via the group photo), thereby discounting the extremity 
of the target person’s ability.  Second, when observers were merely informed that the 
target was being rated for group output and shown a photo of the target alone, they failed 
to discount the situational factor and perceived his creativity as if the target was solely 
responsible for the group output.   
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Chapter 4. Discussion and Conclusion 
4.1 General Discussion 
The present research demonstrated that the group setting influences how 
observers evaluate the creativity of output and target.  Although demographic diversity is 
inconsistently related to cognitive diversity in direct empirical tests (Bell, Villado, 
Lukasik, Belau, & Briggs, 2011), Study 2 demonstrated that people have a lay theory that 
demographically diverse groups have more cognitive diversity and this in turn influences 
the creativity assessment of group output.  As predicted, people expected 
demographically diverse groups to be more creative, and their assessment of creativity 
depended on how well a group’s output matched expectations.  The first three studies 
showed that demographically diverse groups receive a bonus for creative output (a highly 
creative company logo) – their product was rated as more creative than the same product 
attributed to a homogeneous group.  But Study 3 also showed that diverse groups are 
penalized for uncreative output (an uncreative company logo) that failed to meet the high 
expectations. 
It is important to note that the lay theory tested in Chapter 2 was specifically 
about how a group’s demographic diversity influences the creativity assessment of group 
output.  As an extension, Study 1 and Study 4 explored how this lay theory influences 
perceptions of an individual member in a diverse group.  First, Study 1 investigated 
implications of the biased assessment by having participants first evaluate the group 
output (i.e. the creative logo) as a function of group diversity and then the target person 
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(i.e., group diversity à perceived creativity of group output à perceived target 
creativity).  In such cases, observers continued to use favorable impressions of the 
diverse group to assess the individual: The same person was judged to be more creative 
and more worthy of being hired in a diverse group.  Second, rather than studying 
individual creativity as the spill-over effect from group perceptions, Study 4 had 
observers make judgments about individual creativity based on the group photo at the 
beginning of study (i.e., group diversity à perceived target creativity) and demonstrated 
that merely being featured in a diverse group made observers believe that the same target 
person possessed more cognitive diversity even though the target was evaluated for 
individual work.  Furthermore, mediation analysis revealed that this difference in 
perceived cognitive diversity of the target in turn positively influenced the assessment of 
target creativity.   
There could be two possible reasons for this observed effect of membership in a 
diverse group on perceptions of individual creativity.  First, the simple surrounding of 
demographically diverse group members (who were previously found to be more creative 
as a group) could have primed diversity and made the target appear more creative.  
Second, observers could have held a more elaborate theory about individual creativity in 
a diverse group.  For example, observers could have believed that the target benefited by 
interacting with a diverse group of people although the target was evaluated for 
individual work.  Alternatively, they could have believed that the type of person who 
self-selected into a demographically diverse group possessed more creative traits.  In sum, 
 61 
 
while the results in Chapter 2 show initial support for the idea that people’s lay theory of 
diversity can influence evaluation of individual creativity, further research is needed to 
systematically explore the mechanism behind the observed effect.    
Next, the second half of this research investigated a different question of how a 
team setting influences perceptions of creativity.  Chapter 3 demonstrated that asking 
about the same person’s creativity led to different answers as a function of whom the 
target is shown with, and this biased perception of creativity either benefited or cost the 
target, depending on the objective quality of group output.  In Study 5, compared to being 
featured with other members of his team, Jonathan Ive was rated to be more creative 
when he was depicted alone, even though it was clear both involved the design of the 
same Apple products.  In other words, Ive’s ability was discounted when he was 
evaluated with other members because visual salience of the group members reminded 
observers that the group also deserved some credit for the innovative designs.  Lastly, 
using two group photos that varied on demographical diversity of group members, the 
robustness of the visual salience effect was observed as there was a significant difference 
between each type of group photo when compared to the photo of Jonathan Ive alone. 
Study 6 built on this by demonstrating that the presence of others affects 
perception of creativity differently depending on the objective quality of the output.  With 
a highly creative company logo, the target was rated to be more creative when he was 
shown alone compared to being featured in a group.  With an uncreative company logo, 
the opposite pattern emerged: The target person was rated to be less creative when he was 
 62 
 
shown alone compared to being featured in a group.  In other words, by hiding the group, 
the target received an undeserved bonus individually for a creative product and an 
underserved penalty for an uncreative product.  The presence of group members acted as 
a buffer that not only became an additional source for credit when the output was 
objectively creative but also a target for spreading the blame when the output was below 
the expectation.   
Furthermore, Study 6 used an output that could be attributed to either an 
individual alone or the group and the perceived target creativity was compared between 
the two conditions.  When observers were informed that the target was being rated for 
group output and shown a photo of the target alone, they failed to discount the situational 
factor and perceived his creativity as if the target was solely responsible for the group 
output.   
4.2 Future Research 
While the results in Chapter 2 show initial support for a lay theory of diversity on 
perceived creativity, there are number of possible areas for further research.  First, one 
can test new implications of people’s lay theory that demographic diversity leads to 
creativity by studying how people assemble a creative workforce.  For example, 
participants can pretend to be managers at a firm charged with a task of forming a 
creative think tank and one can observe the demographic diversity of the assembled team 
based on a list of possible candidates that possess similar skillsets but different 
demographics.  Second, there may be several moderators of the diversity effect.  For 
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example, observers with a positive attitude toward diversity (Homan, Greer, Jehn, & 
Koning, 2010; Homan, Van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007) may be 
especially likely to expect greater creativity from diverse groups.  Another possible 
moderator is the timing of when group diversity information is presented relative to the 
experience (i.e. the logo).  Previous studies have assumed a top-down process where 
conceptual information influences expectations which in turn affect subjective 
interpretation of a stimulus.  For example, Coke was rated higher when participants 
consumed the beverage from a cup with the brand logo rather than an unmarked cup 
(McClure et al., 2004).  Similarly participants in Study 1 and 3 were always shown a 
group photo first, formed their expectations (either implicitly or explicitly) based on 
group diversity and rated the group output.  However, they could have also seen the 
group photo after seeing the logo and this could have tested whether expectation can 
influence the retrospective interpretation of the experience.  In this regard, Lee, Frederick 
and Ariely (2006) mixed regular beer with balsamic vinegar and had participants taste 
this new beer in three conditions: a blind condition, in which the additive was not 
informed, and two disclosure conditions where the addition of vinegar was mentioned 
either before or after tasting the beer.  They found that the beer was liked much less when 
the disclosure preceded the tasting (compared to the blind and disclosure-after condition), 
suggesting that expectations affect experience rather than modifying retrospective 
interpretation of the experience.   
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Third, future research can look at the boundary conditions for the effect of lay 
theories on diversity.  For example, since some creative tasks may benefit more from 
coordination, motivation, and persistence than from diversity, demographically 
homogeneous groups, which are regarded as more cohesive and cooperative (Mullen, 
Johnson, & Salas, 1991; Williams & O'Reilly, 1998) may be perceived as more effective 
on those tasks.  Moreover, when a product is meant to appeal to a specific segment of a 
market (e.g., African American hair product), a homogeneous group that represents this 
segment may be perceived as being more effective in making the product.  Furthermore, 
different types of diversity may be perceived to be better equipped for specific tasks. For 
example, if the target customers for a product are made up of people with one mix of 
backgrounds, the corresponding mix may be perceived to be more effective than an 
equally diverse mix that does not match the target customers.  
Lastly, the downstream consequence of making judgments based on lay theory 
also warrants attention.  For example, does a manager continue to hold more favorable 
impression of the diverse group after making creativity evaluation?  If the next output 
from the diverse group turned out to be objectively poor in quality but the manager 
continues to hold more favorable impression for the diverse group, this would imply that 
the decision maker does not sufficiently adjust for the counter evidence and holds 
implications for employees who can strategically place themselves in a diverse group 
which is likely to receive more benefit through positive evaluation. 
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4.3 Theoretical Implications 
This research contributes to the creativity literature by answering Kasof’s (1995) 
call to identify key situational factors that can influence the perception of creativity 
output and the creator.  More specifically, this research extends the understanding of how 
the social setting influences perception of creativity in two ways.  First, in addition to 
previous work that showed people hold lay theories on personal traits such as gender and 
race, this research adds to the literature by showing that group level attributes such as 
demographic diversity can also influence perception of creativity.  Chapter 2 
demonstrated that observers hold a lay theory on demographic diversity and this biases 
the evaluation of group output.  In addition, it also explored the mechanism behind this 
effect by showing that diverse groups are believed to possess more cognitive diversity 
and this in turn affects evaluation of group output.  Lastly, it showed that lay theory can 
positively influence the individual perceptions in a diverse group.   
 Second, adding to the work by Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley and Wight (2005) 
which showed that members of a group often estimate their own contribution to group 
output in a self-serving way, Chapter 3 provided evidence that observers of the group are 
also prone to biases in inferring individual contribution from group work.  Although the 
target was evaluated for group output, observers committed the fundamental attribution 
error and gave sole credit to the target as if the target had created the work alone when 
the situational salience was weak.  This work adds to the FAE literature by showing that 
other members in the group can act as a situational factor when inferring individual 
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creativity based on group output and that the situational salience can be manipulated 
visually by showing the target alone or with the rest of the group. 
4.4 Practical Implications 
The research on how group creativity is perceived as a function of demographic 
diversity has practical implications for businesses, schools, and other organizations. 
Observers, such as managers and teachers, are typically aware of the demographic 
composition of groups that they have to evaluate and this knowledge is likely to influence 
their perceptions of group performance across subjective dimensions such as creativity.  
Moreover, organizational efforts to embrace and promote diversity (e.g., diversity 
training) can reinforce people’s lay theory of group diversity on creativity and amplify 
the effects of diversity as either a bonus or a penalty in evaluation.  
The research on the fundamental attribution error also holds important 
implications for both the individual and the organization.  Individuals may reap the 
benefit of different evaluation contexts depending on the objective quality of group 
output.  However, as the individual receives more credit, this may put the organization at 
risk.  When people outside the company saw Jobs as Apple’s only idea man, it upset 
Jonathan Ive because that made them “vulnerable as a company” (Isaacson, 2011) – his 
assertion was later confirmed when Apple stocks dwindled as a function of Jobs’ 
struggling health in the later years of his tenure as CEO (Collingwood, 2009).  After the 
death of Jobs, more people have started to recognize Ive as the creative engine behind 
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Apple.  While this may satisfy Ive, it ironically puts Apple in a vulnerable situation 
similar to when Jobs was alive.   
4.5 Conclusion  
In sum, the questions addressed in this dissertation lay out the foundation for two 
research programs.  The first research question provides new insights on the cognitive 
processes by which people assess group creativity – this work contributes to the initial 
step in exploring how lay theories about groups affect the assessment of group 
performance.  The second research question addresses the attribution error in the 
evaluation of individual creativity and opens the door for further investigation on factors 
that influence how observers infer individual performance in a group context.  Taken 
together, the two questions stress the need for further research on factors that influence 
perception of creativity in the context of an organization. 
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Appendix A. The logos in Study 1 
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Appendix B. The logos in Study 3 
Highly creative logo 
 
Uncreative logo 
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Appendix C. The photos in Study 1  
Homogeneous group 1: Asian females 
 
Homogeneous group 2: Asian males 
 
Homogeneous group 3: Caucasian females 
 
Homogeneous group 4: Caucasian males 
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Diverse group 1 
 
Diverse group 2 
 
  
 72 
 
Appendix D. The two diverse group photos in Study 2 and Study 3 
Diverse group 1 
 
Diverse group 2 
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Appendix E. The questionnaire items in Study 2 
Cognitive diversity 
1. Before creating the logo, this group had to brainstorm for ideas.  One key aspect 
of brainstorming is to have different perspectives.  Overall, how many different 
perspectives do you think the group members had? (1 =  only a few different 
perspectives, 9 = a lot of different perspectives) 
2. As a result of brainstorming, they generated ideas for the logo.  How many unique 
ideas for a logo do you think this group generated in a brainstorming session? (1 = 
only a few unique ideas, 9 = a lot of unique ideas) 
3. Converting ideas into actual logo requires many different skill sets.  Overall, how 
many different skill sets do you think this group had? (1= only a few skill sets, 9= 
a lot of different skill sets) 
4. The group faced obstacles while converting ideas into the actual logo.  How good 
do you think this group is at problem solving? (1= I, 9= very good at problem 
solving) 
Halo effect 
5. While creating the logo, this group was working with various deadlines.  How 
good do you think this group is in meeting work deadlines? (1 = not good at 
meeting deadlines, 9 = very good at meeting deadlines) 
6. How much do you think the members of this group like each other? (1= do not 
like each other at all, 9 = like each other very much) 
 74 
 
7. How much do you think the members of this group hang out with each other after 
work? (1= do not hang out at all, 9 = hang out a lot) 
8. How well do you think the members of this group communicate with each other? 
(1= do not communicate with each other at all, 9 = communicate with each other 
very well) 
9. How much do you think the members of this group trust each other to do their 
parts in creating the logo? (1= do not trust each other at all, 9 = trust each other 
very much) 
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Appendix F. The questionnaire items in Study 4 
Cognitive diversity 
1. Before creating the logo, he had to brainstorm for ideas.  One key aspect of 
brainstorming is to have different perspectives.  Overall, how many different 
perspectives do you think he had while brainstorming for ideas? (1 =  only a few 
different perspectives, 9 = a lot of different perspectives) 
2. As a result of brainstorming, he generated ideas for the logo.  How many unique 
ideas for a logo do you think he generated in brainstorming? (1 = only a few 
unique ideas, 9 = a lot of unique ideas) 
3. He faced obstacles while converting ideas into the actual logo.  How good do you 
think he is at problem solving? (1= I, 9= very good at problem solving) 
Halo effect 
4. While creating the logo, he was working with various deadlines.  How good do 
you think he is in meeting work deadlines? (1 = not good at meeting deadlines, 9 
= very good at meeting deadlines) 
5. How much do you think the members of this group like him? (1= do not like each 
other at all, 9 = like each other very much) 
6. How much do you think he hangs out with his group after work? (1= do not hang 
out at all, 9 = hang out a lot) 
7. How well do you think he communicates with other members? (1= do not 
communicate with each other at all, 9 = communicate with each other very well) 
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8. How much do you think the members of this group trust him to do his parts when 
they work together on a project? (1= do not trust him at all, 9 = trust him very 
much) 
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Appendix G. The photos in Study 5 
Jonathan Ive alone 
 
Jonathan Ive in a demographically homogeneous group 
 
Jonathan Ive in a demographically diverse group 
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Appendix H. The photos in Study 6 
Target alone 
    
Target in a demographically homogeneous group 
 
Target in a demographically diverse group 
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